MINNEAPOLIMEDIA EDITORIAL | 33 Days From Election Day, Minnesota Must Protect Every Ballot and Every Voter

Minnesota has strong election laws, paper ballots and experienced local administrators. The state must now preserve public confidence while replacing lost federal security support and preparing for interference, misinformation and voter intimidation.

ST. PAUL, MN (October 1, 2026).

Minnesota entered the final 33 days before the November 3 general election with voting already underway, statewide contests tightening and election administrators carrying responsibilities that extend well beyond preparing polling places.

Absentee voting began September 18. The Office of the Minnesota Secretary of State reported that 384,995 ballots were sent to voters during the first week. Those ballots represent the opening stage of an election that will determine Minnesota’s next governor, fill an open United States Senate seat, select all eight members of the state’s congressional delegation and decide state legislative and local contests across the state.

The political campaigns will dominate television advertisements, mailboxes and social media during October. Election officials have a different assignment. They must administer a process that is accurate, accessible and secure while answering public questions about mail service, federal involvement, cybersecurity and the conduct of observers near polling locations.

Minnesota is not approaching this election without protections. The state uses paper ballots. Voting equipment is tested before every election. Public accuracy tests allow citizens to observe whether tabulators properly read ballots marked in different ways. Absentee ballots are tracked through the statewide voter-registration system, and election officials use safeguards to prevent a person from voting both absentee and at a polling place.

These procedures deserve greater public attention. Confidence in an election should rest on verifiable practices rather than allegiance to a candidate or party. Minnesota’s system gives officials a physical record of each vote and established procedures for testing equipment, maintaining custody of ballots and reviewing results.

The state’s election structure is strong. The conditions surrounding the 2026 election are more unsettled.

Minnesota is replacing federal support at a difficult moment

Secretary of State Steve Simon has warned that the federal government has reduced election-security assistance that states came to rely upon after foreign interference in the 2016 election. Minnesota officials previously received federal intelligence briefings, cybersecurity testing and opportunities to rehearse responses to threats such as hacking, bomb scares and disruptions at election offices.

Simon told MPR News that Minnesota had not received the intelligence briefings it once received and that federal agencies were no longer providing the same cybersecurity testing and emergency exercises. He estimated that Minnesota could spend as much as $250,000 replacing lost federal assistance.

That amount is manageable within a state budget. The larger concern is the loss of national coordination.

Cyber threats do not stop at state borders. A federal security agency can identify a pattern across several states, warn election offices about malicious activity and distribute technical guidance quickly. Minnesota can strengthen its own systems, hire private expertise and coordinate with other states, but recreating a national view from separate state operations is difficult.

The federal government released a new election-infrastructure security plan in September, but election officials around the country questioned whether it arrived early enough and whether federal agencies retained the staff and resources needed to carry it out. Minnesota should use any reliable federal assistance that remains available. It should not assume that assistance will arrive on time.

The Legislature and governor must ensure that the Secretary of State’s Office and local election administrators have immediate access to emergency money, technical expertise and legal support through certification of the results. Those resources should cover network monitoring, physical security, communications, backup equipment and rapid response to false claims intended to disrupt voting.

Election security is a public obligation. Counties and cities should not have to choose between protecting election systems and funding their other basic responsibilities.

The dispute over federal observers established a warning

Minnesota saw an unusual conflict during the August primary when the United States Department of Justice sought to place monitors inside polling locations in Hennepin and Ramsey counties.

The counties declined the request. Federal staff remained outside the 100-foot boundary established by Minnesota law, and state officials monitored their activities. Voters were not required to speak with them. No major interruption of voting was reported.

The episode ended without confrontation, but it established questions that must be answered before November.

Who has authority to enter a polling place? What should an election judge do if a federal official demands access? How will local officials distinguish authorized activity from conduct that could intimidate voters? Which agency will respond if observers interfere with a voter or attempt to direct election workers?

The answers should not be improvised on Election Day.

Minnesota law restricts activity near polling locations and protects voters from interference. Local election officials, county attorneys, the attorney general and law-enforcement agencies should issue coordinated public guidance before November 3. Election judges need direct instructions and a telephone number that produces immediate legal assistance. Voters need to know that government officials, campaign representatives and private observers cannot obstruct access, direct their choices or require them to answer questions outside the voting process.

This preparation should not be framed as hostility toward lawful observation. Election observation can promote transparency when observers follow established rules. The state should accommodate legitimate oversight while enforcing the same boundaries for everyone.

Authority inside a polling place belongs to the officials responsible for administering Minnesota law. No political administration, federal or state, should use official presence to create confusion or discourage eligible citizens from voting.

Paper ballots provide evidence, but the public must understand the process

Minnesota’s use of paper ballots is one of its most important safeguards. A paper record allows election officials to compare physical ballots with machine totals during audits, recounts or legal challenges.

Paper alone does not create public confidence. Officials must explain the full process.

Every local jurisdiction should publicize the date, time and location of its public accuracy test. Residents, candidates and reporters should attend. Officials should demonstrate how tabulators handle properly marked ballots, overvotes, blank contests and marks that require human review. They should explain how machines are secured after testing and how ballots move from polling places to counting and storage locations.

After the election, officials should publish clear information about canvassing, post-election review and certification. A preliminary result reported on election night is not the same as the official result. Close contests may require careful review, and absentee ballots must be handled according to applicable deadlines and court rulings.

Transparency is particularly important when legitimate administrative delays are easily portrayed online as evidence of misconduct. Election officials cannot prevent every false allegation. They can reduce the space in which false allegations spread by communicating early, correcting errors promptly and showing the public how the system works.

Candidates carry responsibility as well. A candidate may challenge a decision, request a recount or pursue a legal remedy. A candidate should not declare an election corrupt merely because the count is incomplete or the result is unfavorable.

Every campaign should commit now to respect verified results and use established legal procedures for genuine disputes. That standard applies equally to Democrats, Republicans, third-party candidates and independents.

Mail voting requires careful communication

Minnesota voters have several ways to participate. They may vote absentee by mail, cast an absentee ballot in person or vote at their polling place on November 3. The state has promoted these options through its “Three Ways to Vote” campaign.

Mail voting is convenient, but the final weeks require attention to delivery time and changing federal rules. Secretary Simon has already issued public statements about United States Postal Service procedures and court decisions affecting mailed ballots.

Voters who plan to use the mail should request and return ballots early. A ballot delayed in transit cannot be counted merely because the voter intended to meet the deadline. Voters should use the state’s official tracking system to confirm that an absentee ballot was received and accepted. Anyone whose ballot has not been accepted should contact a county or municipal election office while time remains to correct the problem or use another lawful voting method.

Election offices should communicate these instructions repeatedly and in multiple languages. They should make clear which deadline controls, whether a postmark is sufficient and what voters should do as Election Day approaches. Advice must reflect current Minnesota law and controlling court decisions rather than outdated instructions copied from a previous election.

The state should also publish prompt updates if postal performance deteriorates in a particular region. Waiting until ballots are late would leave voters without a remedy.

Confidence requires accuracy from political leaders and the press

Minnesotans are entering this election with economic anxiety, strong partisan divisions and closely watched statewide races. A September KSTP/SurveyUSA poll placed Amy Klobuchar seven percentage points ahead of Lisa Demuth in the governor’s contest. Other polling showed Peggy Flanagan holding a narrower advantage over Michele Tafoya in the United States Senate race.

Those findings show competitive campaigns. They do not establish the final result, and they do not justify describing every contest as a dead heat. Polls are estimates based on samples, assumptions about turnout and responses collected during a particular period.

Campaigns and news organizations should report the date, sample, margin of error and sponsor of every poll they cite. Headlines designed to create suspense should not erase meaningful differences in the data.

The same discipline must govern reporting about election administration. A registration error is not proof of widespread fraud. An equipment malfunction is not proof that votes were changed. A legal disagreement between state and federal officials is not proof that the election has already been compromised.

At the same time, public confidence should not be demanded through slogans. Election offices must respond candidly when errors occur, document corrective action and release records that can be made public. Trust is earned through evidence and accountability.

The press should distinguish verified threats from hypothetical risks and explain what officials are doing about each one. That approach informs voters without minimizing danger or magnifying rumor.

Election workers need protection and public support

The people administering the election are state and county officials, municipal clerks, election judges, information-technology specialists and temporary workers. Many are neighbors serving their communities for modest compensation.

They work long hours under intense scrutiny. Some have faced threats, harassment and accusations based on misinformation. Minnesota cannot maintain an accurate election system if experienced administrators leave because public service has become personally dangerous.

State and local governments should protect election workers’ private information where legally permissible, establish procedures for reporting threats and prosecute credible intimidation. Polling places should have security plans that protect workers and voters without turning civic spaces into intimidating environments.

Political leaders should stop treating election workers as acceptable targets. Criticism of an official decision is legitimate. Publishing a worker’s personal information, threatening a family or accusing local staff of crimes without evidence is not legitimate political speech. It is an attack on the people whose labor makes voting possible.

Minnesota should also continue recruiting election judges from different political affiliations, age groups, professions and communities. A broad workforce improves capacity and allows more Minnesotans to observe the administration of elections directly.

Voter access must remain central

Security and access are not competing objectives. A secure election is one in which every eligible voter can cast a ballot and every valid ballot is counted once.

Minnesota has expanded automatic voter registration, restored voting rights for people who are no longer incarcerated for a felony conviction and increased language-access resources. Election administrators must ensure that these changes are implemented consistently across counties and explained accurately to voters.

Communities with large immigrant and refugee populations need reliable translated information and trained interpreters. Voters with disabilities need functioning accessible equipment and polling places they can enter. People experiencing homelessness need correct guidance about registration. College students, residents of long-term-care facilities and people who recently moved need information suited to their circumstances.

Local officials should identify access problems now, while there is time to correct them. The final week before an election is too late to discover that a polling place is inaccessible, trained interpreters are unavailable or an election office cannot handle the volume of absentee voters.

Preparation must continue through certification

November 3 is not the end of the election process. Ballots must be secured, results canvassed, required reviews completed and outcomes certified. Close races may bring recounts or litigation. False claims may intensify after preliminary results appear.

State officials should maintain enhanced security, legal staffing and public communication until every Minnesota result is certified. They should prepare for attempts to pressure canvassing boards, interfere with ballot custody or exploit ordinary changes between preliminary and official totals.

The public should also expect patience. Accuracy may require time, particularly in close contests. Speed is valuable, but an election result should never be rushed to satisfy television schedules or social-media demands.

Minnesota has experience, paper ballots, public testing, professional administrators and a legal framework capable of producing a reliable election. Those strengths should give voters confidence. They should not create complacency.

The state is entering the final month with less federal security support, unresolved tension over federal monitoring, changing rules affecting mailed ballots and a political environment in which routine procedures can be distorted within minutes. Meeting those challenges will require clear authority, adequate resources and constant public communication.

Secretary Simon, Attorney General Ellison, county officials and municipal clerks should publish a coordinated final-month readiness plan. It should address cybersecurity, physical security, federal observers, mail-ballot contingencies, public accuracy testing, voter intimidation, emergency legal response and post-election certification.

Candidates should tell their supporters that lawful participation strengthens democracy and intimidation weakens it. News organizations should verify claims before amplifying them. Voters should make plans early, obtain information from official sources and report interference immediately.

Thirty-three days remain before Election Day. Minnesota has enough time to close identified gaps, answer unresolved questions and show voters exactly how their ballots will be protected.

The work must begin before a crisis, continue through the count and end only when every lawful vote has been included in a certified result.

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